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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is conferred on Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(j).
Case has been transferred to Court of Appeals

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Court of Appeals reviews motion to dismiss "De Novo", giving no deference to
trial court findings.1
a. Issue Number One: First Issue to be determined by the Court is
whether Trial Court committed plain error when dismissed this case
after Court of Appeals had already reviewed the case and found that

1

Kidd v. Taos Ski Valley, Inc., 88 F3d. 848 (10th Cir. 1996)
4

Plaintiff had stated a claim for fraud. Law of the Case Doctrine should
apply. In addition, principle or Res Judicata also apply because
Defendant had opportunity to raise the standard of Fraud issue in
previous appeal and failed to do so. Allowing defendant to raise
standard of fraud issue now violates Res Judicata,
b. Issue Number Two:

Whether Trial court was in error when it

found that Plaintiff did not believe the False Representations of
Forsyth. The issue in establishing a claim of Fraud is "Justifiable
Reliance5'. Plaintiff pled that he had made justifiable reliance. (First
Amended Claim Paragraph 15). In a Motion to Dismiss, Trial Court
must assume that the claim is true. Therefore dismissal at this point is
an error of law. In addition issue of reliance is usually reserved for Jury
to decide. It also seems to be against public policy for Defendant to
have gotten dismissed by claiming that Plaintiff couldn't have believed
her. Supreme court stated "General moral level of business and other
financial relationship would not be enhanced by a rule of law which
would allow a person to defend against a willful, deliberate fraud bys

2

Robinson v. Trip co, Case Number 990490-CA, (UT APP. 2000)
Berkeley Bank v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (UT 1980)
5

stating, "you should not have trusted or believed be" or "had you not
been so gullible you would not have been [so] Deceived"".
c. Issue Number Three:

Whether Trial Court was in error in

determining that Cline failed to properly plead a RICO claim because
he failed to state the times that the items were mailed. This is an error
of law, as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that date and
time are material in a fraud claim. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do
not require specific Date and Time. Because this case is being litigated
in State Court, the State rules apply, (see this courts reasoning in cline
v State 20070034). Therefore dismissing RICO claim is an error of
law. This should be reviewed De Novo, giving no deference to trial
courts reasoning.
d. Issue Number Four:

Whether Trial court was in error when it

charged Plaintiff with Sanctions. As the Defendants pointed out in
there Affidavit in Support of Sanctions, Plaintiff had previously filed
causes of actions against Forsyth in a case in Fourth District, after
those causes of action had already been dismissed previously in Third
District. At the time Defendants brought the motion for sanctions
against Cline, that case in Fourth District had already been dismissed

3

IBID.
6

with respect to Forsyth, therefore, principles of Res Judicata should
have applied with respect to Sanctions because clearly defendant could
and should have brought them in the fourth district case. Since they
failed to bring them in that case, they should be bared from bringing
them in this case. In addition, the standard that Cline was supposed to
have understood, doesn't even make scene, to him. Case gets
remanded from Court of Appeals with the instructions that "Cline had
stated a Claim for Fraud" and Attorney General gets to challenge that
issue, but Cline does not get to revisit any of the issues that Court of
Appeals ruled on. In addition the standard for sanction is and error
done with the intent to harass. Trial courts findings are inadequate as
they don't address the fact that the amended claim was done to harass
or to cause needless delay. Again this should be reviewed as and error
of law.
e. Issue Number Five: Whether Trial court made a manifest error when
it awarded legal fees to Defendant for Sanctions, but didn't properly
evaluate the time Defendant claimed to spend on the Sanctions. The
Supreme Court has stated "An award of attorney fees must be based
upon the evidence and supported by findings of fact." Cottonwood
Mall Co v. Sine 830 P.2d (UT 1992). One who seeks and award of

7

attorney fees, therefore, has the burden of producing evidence to
buttress the requested award. See id. At 268; Hall Taylor Association.
V. Unionamereica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (UT 1982). When the evidence
presented is insufficient, and award of attorneys fees cannot stand. See
Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 989". Defendant failed to include any
detail in his affidavit of attorneys fees and trial court failed to make
any finding as to the reasonableness of those fees. Therefore Trial
Court has exceeded its disscression and attorneys fees should be
overturned.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Case started when DCFS was ordered, through a protective order, to
investigate allegations that Plaintiff had abused his son. During the protective order
period, DCFS and its investigator, Chris Forsyth concluded that Plaintiff had not
abused his children. After the Protective order case was dismissed and with no
subsequent court order to re-investigate allegations that Plaintiff had abused his
children, Chris and DCFS decided to start a new investigation against Plaintiff.
DCFS substantiated abuse against Plaintiff with intent to destroy his chances
to get custody of his children. The allegations of abuse were fraudulent. A Juvenal
Court subsequently ruled that DCFS and Chris Forsyth had "no basis to Charge
Plaintiff with abuse".
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Plaintiff filed suit in District court seeking damages and Injunctive relief
against defendants. Counsel for Defendants made a motion for dismissal. Motion
was granted and Plaintiff has appealed.
In the appeal, Court of Appeals found that Plaintiff had stated a claim for
Fraud. Upon Remand, Counsel for Defense Filed a second motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff Amended Claim. In amending claim, Plaintiff was charged with Sanctions.
Court awarded defense attorneys fees for sanctions. Plaintiff has appealed the case a
second time.
RELEVANT FACTS
The following facts are relevant to the issues of this case:
1.

On or about February 29,2002, Plaintiffs then wife (Julie) filed a
Fraudulent Protective Order in which she alleged that Petitioner had
abused their Minor Son Robert, (pp 130-135 )

2.

Julie fraudulently failed to disclose that Robert was already under
Jurisdiction of Juvenal Court and as such orders surrounding DCFS
investigation of alleged abuse of Robert and appointment of Guardian ad
Litem was void for lack of jurisdiction.4 (pp 132)

3.

Third District Court issued an order (March 1,2002) that DCFS was to
investigate if Plaintiff was abusing his children, (pp 134)

4

In re Kelly, 46 Federal Reporter 653 (1890)
9

4.

Any Recommendations were specifically ordered to come from the GAL,
notDCFS.(ppl34)

5.

On or about March 4,2002, Plaintiff called DCFS hot line to ask how
investigation ordered by court was going and to report child abuse
perpetrated by Julie, (pp 138 and 143)

6.

On about March 5,2002 Chris Forsyth was assigned to investigate all
claims made by Plaintiff including the allegations made by Julie against
him. (pp 143)

7.

Never at any time was Chris Forsyth court ordered to investigate claims
that Julie was abusing the children.

8.

The only court ordered investigation was claims the Plaintiff was abusing
the children.

9.

On March 7,2002, Chris was informed of protective order that ordered her
to investigate allegations of abuse against plaintiff and that the allegation
of abuse was a spanking incident, (pp 143, fifth paragraph and ninth
paragraph.)

10.

On March 11,2002 Chris Forsyth contacted Robert, (pp 146)

11.

On March 15,2002, Chris made contact with Julie and was again informed
of Protective Order, and that Plaintiff had been "heavy handed" by
spanking the children, (pp 148)
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12.

By March 15,2002 Chris had also had a chance to talk to GAL Anthony
Ferdon about case. (pp 148)

13.

On March 18,2002 Chris Forsyth had an opportunity to interview all the
children about abuse allegations, (pp 150-151)

14.

On March 19,2002 Chris again spoke to the GAL. She also received a
copy of the protective order that ordered that DCFS investigate that
allegation the Robert was abused by Plaintiff, (pp 151)

15.

On March 20,2002 Plaintiff spoke with Chris Forsyth's supervisor and
she denied that a protective order existed, so Plaintiff faxed a copy of it to
them. ( pp 152)

16.

On March 20,2002, Plaintiff met with Chris in her office and she related
that none of the children had said there was any bruising therefore she
would not substantiate against him for spanking Robert and his other
children. She also stated that she would close the case, (pp 153 and pp 4 )

17.

On March 21,2001, District Court dismissed Protective order against
Robert and DCFS involvement should have ended in the case, (pp 166)

18.

On March 21,2002, Juvenal Court granted Plaintiff custody of Robert, (pp
154 and 167-168)
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19.

Chris was there at Juvenal Court hearing because Judge Hornick had asked
her to attend to specifically discuss the allegations that were contained in
the protective related to Plaintiffs alleged abuse of Robert, (pp 4)

20.

On March 27,2002, Chris was closing out the case, (pp 154)

21.

On April 2,2002 Chris claimed to get an extension on the case, but the
claim is ridicules because March 27, allegation has nothing to do with
child abuse. (Mother not letting Children talk to Parent is not child abuse)
(pp 154)

22.

On April 11,2002 Protective Order was completely dismissed (pp 5)

23.

At that point District Court had no more jurisdiction to need or request that
DCFS continue investigating Plaintiff. Any investigation after that was
not court ordered but was on DCFS's own volition.

24.

On April 11,2002 at 10:00 A. M. Chris claims to have been contacted by
GAL Michelle Bloomquist to investigate new charges that Plaintiff had
spanked his children abusively, (pp 154)

25.

The allegation was made up because court didn't even start until after
10:00, and Michelle was not available to make a phone call until after
about 12:30. (pp 166)

26.

On April 16,2002 Chris on her own volition opened a new investigation
and there is no indication that it was court ordered, (pp 155)

12

27.

On April 30,2002 Chris and various DCFS workers decided to charge
Plaintiff with Child Abuse.

28.

There is absolutely no court order from Divorce court regarding DCFS
investigating Abuse allegations, (pp 120

29.

The allegation that Plaintiff had abused his children was Fraudulent and
meant to cause problems for him in a Divorce Action, (pp 5 and 8)

30.

DCFS made decisions that were based upon a gender bias, (pp 9)

31.

Because allegation is that Defendants actions were fraudulent, each and
every aspect of fraud must be assumed including that defendant knew that
the allegations made against Plaintiff were false.5

32.

DCFS workers including Chris Forsyth's supervisor knew that Chris was
making up fraudulent allegations of abuses against Plaintiff, (pp 18)

33.

DCFS did nothing to stop it, and in fact helped to cover up Chris's fraud.
(pP18)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In first Appeal6 Court of appeals found that Forsyth had Judicial

Immunity for the acts that she was court ordered to do. Since she was never
court ordered to investigate allegations that Julie Cline was abusing the
Children, all her fraudulent actions from her investigations of Julie should
5
6

Robinson v. Tripico 21 P.3d 219 (UT App. 2000)
Cline v. State, 2005 UT App.
13

not be protected by judicial immunity. Even so, this court found that Cline
had in fact stated a claim for Fraud against Forsyth in her first second
investigation against Cline.
Trial Court was in error to have dismissed the case a second time, for
several reasons including, that Defendant should have raised issue of
standard of Fraud in the original appeal and it is now barred by Res Judicata
and The Law of the Case. Trial Court is also in error to dismiss claim
because it found that Plaintiff "didn't believe allegations of Defendant.
Cline clearly pled that he made "justifiable reliance" on Forsyth's
Fraudulent Allegations, therefore speculating beyond that, on part of trial
court is in error because on a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff is to be granted all
reasonable inferences. In order to overcome that inference, Cline would
have to have plead that he didn't believe. Finding of Reasonableness of
Plaintiffs actions in a Fraud Case need to be done by the Jury at trial, not by
the Trial Court in a Motion to Dismiss.
In addition, the findings of trial court on issue of attorneys fees in
sanctions, was inadequate because there was not enough information
presented to trial court or to plaintiff for that matter to allow them to
adequately ensure that all fees claimed by counsel for defense were really
needed for sanctions argument.

14

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
On appeal, Cline claims that decision to dismiss Fraud Claim was improper
because Court of Appeals had already ruled that Plaintiff has stated a claim for fraud,
Per Law of Case Doctrine, once appellate court has made a ruling, inferior court is
bound by that decision7 When the trial court deviates from the decision of an
appellate courts opinion, that decision is Void. Per Law of Case, this court is also
bound by its previous decision. Therefore, this court should overturn trial courts
second dismissal of this case.
In addition to Law of Case Doctrine, Res Judicata should also apply to Trial
Courts second dismissal of this case. Clearly Defendants had opportunity to bring
out the objections to Plaintiffs pleading of fraud claim and failed to do so. They also
had opportunity to bring those objections up in this court during the first appeal.
Appeal is now dismissed and defendants second attempt to have this case dismissed
should not be allowed to stand when they had ample opportunity to argue the issues
in the firs appeal and failed to do so. If this court allows this situation to stand, then
litigation will go on forever because parties to a motion to dismiss will bring up only
one issue at a time and motions to dismiss will never end. In addition, Issues of Res
Judicata are usually resolved in favor of a litigant having his day in court. For all

7
8

Thurston V. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (UT 1995)
BYU v Tremco 20020540 UT 2005
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these reasons Trial Court decision is in error of law and should be reviewed De
Novo, giving no deference to trial courts reasoning..
Trial Court was also in error when it made findings that Cline didn't believe
the fraudulent allegations of Forsyth. Clines First Amended Claim clearly states the
he had made justifiable reliance on Forsyth's fraudulent statement. In order for him
to have made justifiable reliance, he would have either had to have believed her
statements, or there was some other situation that prevented cline from fully
investigating her false claims.
In this case, during the protective order period, Cline was completely
prohibited from talking with his children. In other words, he didn't have any way to
check out with the children what they may have told Forsyth. Also because she was
holding herself out as an expert in investigating child abuse, it was reasonable for
Cline who at the time had little background in divorce law or protective orders, to
have gone along with what Forsyth, the Guardian ad Liter and his attorney were
telling him about what would happen in court. Therefore his decision was reasonable
under the situation. "Policy underlying requirement that on claiming fraud must show
that he acted reasonably under the circumstances is to discourage inattention to one's
own interests; however, policy should not be carried so far that the law ignores
positive acts of fraud practiced on innocent persons."9

9

Cheever v. Schramm 577 P.2d 951 (UT 1978)
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It would also be impossible for trial court to determine whether Cline believed
the allegations or not at this point in the litigation. Defense is pointing to the fact that
Cline questioned Forsyth's findings and trying to make a case that she should get off
of her fraudulent behavior because Cline questioned her allegations. The long term
effects of this type of ruling is contrary to public policy because it essentially says to
the public, "if you think you thing you might betaken advantage of, don't do anything
to question it, because if you do you will no be able to have a case against those who
defraud you.
"General moral level of business and other financial relationship would not be
enhanced by a rule of law which would allow a person to defend against a willful
deliberate fraud by stating, "you should not have trusted or believed me" or "Had you
not been so gullible you would not have been {sol deceived""10
The legal standard is Justifiable reliance. The issue of Justifiable reliance is to
be decided by a Jury. Certainly not at a Motion to Dismiss. Therefore dismissal of
case is in error.
In addition there were fraudulent statements made about what the children had
told Forsyth that were made during the time of the first protective order, but which
were not court ordered. For example all the claims that Cline had made about Julie
abusing the children were never court ordered to be investigated. "An important

10

Berkley Bank v. Meibos 607 P.2d 798
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prerequisite of absolute immunity in this context is that the defendant social worker
'act as an actual functionary of the court, not only in status or denomination but in
reality"11 It was therefore an error for the court to dismiss Clines claim that Forsyth's
false allegations of what the children had told her related to investigation of Julie is
not protected by absolute immunity. It was the Fraudulent claims that Forsyth had
made regarding the children's supposed statements that Julie had not abused them
that caused Defendant to agree to have the children live with Julie, and allow her to
stay in the marital home. At the time of the first protective order dismissal, Cline had
no reason to disbelieve Forsyth's statement.
Cline also takes issue with the dismissal of the RICO claim. The standard that
the Trial Court used was that Cline had failed to specify the dates that both pieces of
fraudulent mail were sent was not included in the complaint. If this claim was being
litigated in a Federal Court, that issue would clearly apply., because Federal rules of
Civil procedure clearly call for Date and Time to be included in the pleading. On the
other hand, State rules so not require the same specificity of time and place.
Cline also appeals the trial courts decision regarding sanction and attorneys
fees. Court found that Cline had modified his claim to include some of the issues
that had already been resolved by the court of appeals previous decision. On the
other hand the Trial court allowed Defendants to litigate a second time the issue of

11

Cline v. State (UT App. 2004)
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what constitutes fraud. In light of that issue, it would be very difficult for Cline to
have clearly understood the distinction if there is one. That makes the courts finding
that Cline is not a beginner to the principles of law difficult to justify.
Cline also argues that defendants should have raised that issue of filing an
additional claim after the first one was dismissed in the previous fourth district case.
By their failure to do so, their claims should be bared by res judicata.
Cline also argues that Trial Court had an obligation to review attorneys fees
as submitted by Defense attorney. Defense attorney also has obligation to put
enough detail in his affidavit of attorneys fees that the court can make a
determination as to how reasonable the fees charged were and to make sure that they
don't include time spent on issues that are not chargeable. Trial court made a
manifest error when it awarded legal fees to Defendant for Sanctions, but didn't
properly evaluate the time Defendant claimed to spend on the Sanctions. The
Supreme Court has stated "An award of attorney fees must be based upon the
evidence and supported by findings of fact." Cottonwood Mall Co v. Sine 830 P.2d
(UT 1992). One who seeks and award of attorney fees, therefore, has the burden of
producing evidence to buttress the requested award. See id. At 268; Hall Taylor
Association. V. Unionamereica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (UT 1982). When the evidence
presented is insufficient, and award of attorneys fees cannot stand. See Dixie State
Bank, 764 P.2d at 989". Defendant failed to include any detail in his affidavit of

19

attorneys fees and trial court failed to make any finding as to the reasonableness of
those fees. Therefore Trial Court has exceeded its disscression and attorneys fees
should be overturned.^ This court should rule that affidavit of attorneys fees is not
adequate and attorneys fees should be eliminated in Sanctions issue.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that trial court was in error when the claim was dismissed a second time.
Trial court also abused its discursion in failure to scrutinize award of attorneys fees.
Case should be remanded back to trial court. In addition, Plaintiff request costs on
this appeal as this appeal was unnecessary based upon the previous ruling of this
court.
Respectfully Submitted this^Z/Pay of May, 2007
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was hand delivered this, 2/day of May 2007 to:

J. Clifford Petersen (8315)
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellees
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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Exhibits
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; representations to
court; sanctions.
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by
at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is
not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall
state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of
the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the
attorney or party.
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other
paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances,
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the
conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law
firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the
violation.
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(c)(1) How initiated.
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct
alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but
shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after
service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the
challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not
withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the
party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees
incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a
law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners,
members, and employees.
(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and
directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated
subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this
rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of
a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the
movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for
a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless
the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement
of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be
sanctioned.
(c)(2)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the
sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not
apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions
that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
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